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The first springs of great events, like those of great rivers, are often mean and little. 
  
Jonathan Swift, 1667-1745 
  
I.  Introduction 
 
A succession of crises in emerging market economies over the 1990s ignited a debate in 
academic and policymaking circles about the transmission of shocks across national borders. The 
spreading market strain surrounding the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian credit crunch of 
1997, and the Russian devaluation and Long-Term Capital Management’s (LTCM) implosion of 
1998 have spawned a body of work that can be summarized under the heading of “contagion.” 
These episodes have also resuscitated the interest on codes and standards, monetary 
arrangements, the role of international institutions, and securities law —summarized as the 
international financial architecture— to construct a barrier to prevent contagion. 
The academic literature on contagion, or less pejoratively described as spillovers and the 
international propagation of shocks, has progressed along two roads in recent years.  Early 
studies attempted to document the existence of contagion.  More recent papers have primarily 
sought to discriminate among the possible channels of transmission of disturbances —that is, 
whether shocks propagate through channels established by trade patterns, geography, 
commonalities among lenders, or from other sources.  
In our view, much of this literature suffers from three serious drawbacks. First, most 
studies have not discriminated among the origin of shocks. One expects, a priori, that the global 
or regional consequences of a disturbance may depend importantly on whether the shock —to 
borrow terms from Sir Arthur Lewis— originates in the periphery or in the center. Were the 
regional consequences of the Thai crisis so severe owing to Thailand's direct links with other 
countries in the region or because that shock affected the region's largest economy —Japan? 
Were the paralysis of the bond markets in many parts of the globe and the persistent equity 
market volatility due to the Russian default or to concerns that LTCM’s reach was wider than 
understood and that other firms in other financial centers of the world shared similar failings? 
And what about the dog that did not bark: Why did Ecuador’s 1999 default not have greater 
international consequences?  In contrast, this paper attempts to capture the origins of systemic 
turbulences and measure the direct and indirect linkages among national markets.  
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Second, terms like contagion and spillover can be quite slippery. Some authors seek to 
learn about potential linkages by examining patterns of correlations across markets using long 
time series. Others focus on market behavior during specific episodes dated a priori from other 
sources.  Our approach is data driven.  We define financial turmoil in terms of the behavior of 
financial prices and let the data determine when there were episodes of spillover.  In particular, 
we define days of turmoil as days with extreme returns.1  Using information on the daily 
behavior of stock-market price indexes for thirty-five emerging-to-mature market economies 
from January 1997 to August 1999, we examine what happens in stock markets around the world 
on days of turmoil in financial centers (Germany, Japan, and U.S.) and in crisis-prone emerging 
economies (Brazil, Russia, and Thailand). 
Third, most of the studies in financial spillovers rely on an examination of 
contemporaneous and lagged correlations.  But correlations alone cannot tell apart those 
systemic turbulences due to a common shock (say a large change in oil prices or the 
announcement of election results in an important country) and true spillover (a change in one 
national market directly related to extreme price movements in another market).  To learn about 
the determinants of systemic financial turmoil, we turn to newspapers and summarize the key 
world events associated with significant price changes.  In many cases, this allows us to identify 
the source of the shock —the center or the periphery— and to understand better the temporal 
dimension of the financial market adjustment.  
To be more specific about spillovers, we borrow from the literature on efficiency of 
financial markets to distinguish between “weak-form globalization” and “strong-form 
globalization” of turmoil. Weak-form globalization occurs when country j experiences 
anomalous returns in days of extreme returns in country i, where anomalous behavior is 
interpreted as a change in the distribution of returns assessed by a nonparametric procedure. This 
definition does not require the countries suffering the spillovers to have extreme returns (i.e., to 
be in the 5th and 95th percentile). Strong-form globalization occurs when country j experiences 
turmoil when country i has extreme returns in the stock market. That is, it is a statement about 
simultaneity of extreme returns.   Using these definitions, we construct two indices of 
                                                          
1 Extreme returns are those returns in the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution. 
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globalization and examine the patterns of spillover among crisis-prone emerging markets and 
financial centers. 
While the analysis of more episodes is clearly necessary, one preliminary conclusion we 
draw is that financial shocks often traverse a circuitous route.  Problems occur synchronously in 
many emerging markets on the periphery because a shock in one of them first influenced a 
financial center. If the shock never reaches the center, it is doubtful it can become systemic, 
irrespective of the definition of systemic that is used.  For example, in the case of the Asian 
crisis, Japanese bank exposure to Thailand ―and their subsequent retrenchment from lending to 
other Asian countries― played a prominent role in the spread of the crisis.  The role played by 
the center (i.e. Japan) in this episode was much the same that played by U.S. banks in the 1980s.  
Similarly in 1998, Russia’s default triggered a pervasive widening of spreads that hobbled the 
weakened LTCM and led to a generalized withdrawal of risk taking. Thus, financial centers 
serve a key role in propagating financial turmoil.  When financial centers remain safe, problems 
in an emerging market stop at the region’s border.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief discussion of 
some of the analytical issues that are relevant to our analysis of globalization of financial 
turmoil. Section III constructs the two indices of globalization of financial turmoil and examines 
the pattern of spillover within and across regions. Section IV discusses the origins of high 
spillovers. Concluding remarks are presented in Section V. 
 
II. Analytical Issues 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, we divide the world into center and periphery countries. 
The former consist of the countries that house the largest financial centers (i.e., New York, 
London, Berlin, and Tokyo) while the latter comprise everyone else. We distinguish among three 
patterns in the propagation of shocks. First, there is the transmission of shocks from one 
periphery country to another periphery country, which can take place if the two countries are 
directly linked through bilateral trade or finance (Figure 1). Recent examples of this type of 
transmission mechanism include the adverse impact of the 1997-98 Asian Crisis on Chilean 
exports and the contractionary impact on Argentina of the Brazilian devaluation in January 1999. 
This transmission channel may also be operative if there are bilateral finance links.  For instance, 
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Costa Rican banks were borrowing from Mexican banks on the eve of the Mexican crisis (see 
Sara Calvo and Carmen Reinhart, 1996), but when Mexican banks ran into trouble this source of 
funds disappeared. 
Second, there is the transmission of shocks from one periphery country to another via a 
center country (as shown in Figure 2). There are several prominent examples of this type of 
transmission mechanism in the literature.  Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, Nouriel Roubini, 
and Cedric Tille (1998) model trade competition among the periphery countries in a common 
third “center” market.  For instance, Thailand and Malaysia export many of the same goods to 
Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Hence, when Thailand devalued in mid-1997, the crisis 
spread to Malaysia who lost some of its competitive edge in the common third markets.  
Guillermo Calvo (1998) suggests that Wall Street may have been the carrier of the “Russian 
virus” in the fall of 1998; he focuses on asymmetric information and liquidity problems in the 
financial centers. So, when Russia (a periphery country) defaulted on its bonds, the leveraged 
investors that held those bonds in the center country faced margin calls and needed to raise 
liquidity. The margin calls caused them to sell their asset holdings (the bonds and stock of other 
countries in their portfolio) to an uninformed counterpart.  Because of information asymmetries, 
a “lemons problem” arises and the assets are sold at a firesale price.2 
A variant of this “financial center” story concerns open-end fund portfolio managers who 
need to raise liquidity in anticipation of future redemptions.  As before, the strategy would be to 
sell other assets held in the portfolio.  The sell-off depresses the asset prices of other countries 
and the original disturbance spreads across markets.  Jeffrey Frankel and Sergio Schmukler 
(1998) find evidence suggesting that the crisis in Mexico in late 1994 spread to other equity 
markets in Latin America through New York rather than directly.  Graciela Kaminsky, Richard 
Lyons, and Sergio Schmukler (2001), who examine the behavior of the mutual fund industry in 
international equity markets, support this venue of spillover. They find that in the aftermath of 
the Thai crisis, the largest mutual fund withdrawals affected Hong Kong and Singapore, which 
have the most liquid financial markets.  Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (2000 and 
2001) focus instead on the role of commercial banks lenders in the center country.   They stress 
that following the initial losses due to a crisis in a periphery country, banks’ need to rebalance 
                                                          
2 Also see Guillermo Calvo and Enrique Mendoza (2000) for evidence suggesting that this mechanism can be 
important.   
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the overall risk of their asset portfolio can lead to a marked reversal in commercial bank lending 
across the markets where the bank has exposure.  By calling loans and drying up credit lines to 
the crisis country, center banks deepen the original crisis.  The act of re-calling loans elsewhere, 
they propagate the crisis to other countries.  The Debt crisis in the early 1980s and the Asian 
crisis in 1997 provide two clear examples of this mechanism.  Following Mexico’s default in 
1982, United States banks with an extensive exposure to Mexico, spread the crisis across Latin 
America.  In 1997, Japanese banks, heavily exposed to Thailand, played the same role in 
spreading the crisis throughout Asia. 
Third, there is the transmission of symmetric shocks from the center country to the 
periphery (Figure 3). This is the type of shock stressed in several papers by Guillermo Calvo, 
Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen Reinhart (1993, 1996), who analyze the effect of changes in 
U.S. interest rates on capital flows to Latin America in the early part of the 1990s. While an 
obvious example of this type of shock is changes in interest rates in a financial center country, 
more subtle ones may include the kinds of regulatory changes in the financial centers or 
structural shifts in financial markets. As an example of the latter, the closure of Salomon 
Brothers’ bond arbitrage desk on July 6, 1998 is thought to have been a factor contributing to the 
loss of liquidity in the market for emerging market bonds, making the markets less resilient and 
impairing the prospects of LTCM. 
 
III. Financial Globalization: Measures and Determinants 
 
The crises of the 1990s triggered an immense interest in understanding extreme events. 
The literature in the late 1990s focused mostly on extreme events in the exchange market as 
captured by exchange rate devaluations, foreign exchange reserve losses, and in some cases, 
spikes in overnight interest rates.3   The goal was to examine whether deteriorating fundamentals 
were at the root of these crises.  
                                                          
3 See, for example, Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999). 
 6
But when a variety of countries started to topple like dominoes, many authors began to 
focus also on the characteristics of contagion.4  This literature also deals with issues of systemic 
risk.  But systemic risk is not just connected to currency crises.  Systemic risk may also be 
triggered by shocks in banking and stock or bond markets.  Our goal in this section is to present 
a measure of systemic events triggered by turmoil in a financial market in one country.5 
We understand financial turmoil as an extreme event in a financial market, be it a rally or 
a crash. That is, we confine our definition of extreme events to the tail of the distributions of 
returns by looking at returns in the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution. Because our interest 
is in systemic events, we have to consider a substantially large number of markets. Sometimes 
these systemic events are not long lasting (for example, the worldwide stock market crash in 
October 1987), implying a need to use high-frequency data. This puts some restrictions on the 
markets we can examine. To accommodate these needs, we focus on daily returns in stock 
markets. 
Our dataset spans the period beginning on January 1, 1997 through August 31, 1999. We 
focus on the daily return on equities in the local currency and based on the available local bourse 
indices. The countries in our sample cover mature- and emerging-market economies, thereby 
excluding countries with less developed capital markets and a significant extent of financial 
repression. We can classify the sample into five, somewhat arbitrary, seven-country groupings: 
The G7 countries, which are comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, and the United States; and the transition economies, which include Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The remaining three groups are 
primarily by region. There is the Asian cluster, which includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. The other European group, which 
excludes those countries that are part of the G7, and includes, Finland, Greece, Holland, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. Finally, the Latin American sample consists of the larger economies 
in the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Barry Eichengreen, Andrew Rose, and Charles Wyplosz (1996), Reuven Glick and Andrew 
Rose (1998), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). 
5 See also J. Danielsson and C. de Vries (1997), Olivier De Bandt and Philipp Hartmann (2000), F. Longin (1996) 
and Amine Mati (2001) for studies of extreme returns in stock and bond markets. 
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Table 1 provides summary information on the stock markets examined.  Not surprisingly, 
the degree of instability of stock returns varies considerable across countries.  Thus, our 
definition of extreme events is country-dependent. For example, a drop of 1.8 percent is 
classified as an extreme event in the United States but it takes a 3.94-percent downfall to qualify 
as an extreme event in Indonesia.  
Figure 4 provides the first glimpse of the bunching of turmoil that we are trying to 
explain. This figure reports the percentage of countries with simultaneous extreme changes in 
stock prices (those movements in the 5th and 95th percentiles) around the globe or in various 
regions. The top panel reports the proportion of countries worldwide simultaneously in the 5th or 
95th percentile of the distribution. The five other panels show the same evidence by region. The 
globalization of turmoil is quite evident during the last few days of October 1997 following the 
collapse of the Hong Kong stock market. However, the phenomenon was short lived, 
underscoring the importance of daily data. The simultaneous turbulences in the fall of 1998 were 
quite more persistent. The events that triggered these systemic crashes originated in Russia, 
starting on June 1, 1998 with the suspension of trading in future markets and were fueled further 
by the failed auction of Russian GKO government bills on August 27, 1998. On that day, 74 
percent of the stock markets around the world collapsed. Turbulence persisted until October as 
the crisis in Russia was followed by the dislocation in G-7 financial markets as LTCM spiraled 
downward. The final episode is very short and it is linked to the Brazilian crisis in January 1999.  
Regional turmoil is far more frequent, with the last half of 1997 plagued by problems in most 
countries in Asia.  In the first half of 1998, the turbulence spreads to Latin America, with turmoil 
in Brazil at its core. Fragility in mature markets is mostly concentrated in the fall of 1998.  
Below, we use two definitions of globalization to examine the determinants of world and 
regional instability. 
  
1. Weak-Form Globalization 
 
This definition focuses on whether turmoil in one country (returns in the 5th or 95th 
percentile of the distribution) triggers anomalous behavior in other countries.  Anomalous 
behavior is defined as a change in the distribution of returns. In particular, we estimate the 
frequency distribution of returns in country j on days of turmoil in country i and the frequency 
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distribution of returns in country j on days of no turmoil in country i. We compare these two 
distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions.  We classify a 
country as being affected by extreme crashes or rallies in another country when we reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of the distributions at a 5 percent significance level or less.  We call this 
phenomenon weak-form globalization from country i to country j because it does not impose 
simultaneous occurrence of returns in the tails for globalization to occur. 
We first examine the degree of weak-form globalization triggered by turmoil in three 
financial centers: Germany, Japan, and U.S.  Table 2 reports the spillover of extreme events with 
a country-by-country detail. To get a high-resolution picture of anomalous behavior in the stock 
market, we report the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of returns for all observation in 
the sample and for the observations on days of market turmoil in each of the financial centers. 
For example, the 5th and 95th percentile returns for Argentina for the whole sample are -4.31 and 
3.41. When there is turmoil in the United States, the 5th and 95th percentile returns for Argentina 
become -9.37 and 8.13. As shown in this table, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null 
hypothesis of similar distribution of stock market returns in Argentina on days of financial 
turmoil in the United States and the distribution on all other days. Thus, we catalogue Argentina 
as suffering weak-form globalization from turmoil in the United States. In the event, extreme 
movements in equity markets in the United States are transmitted instantaneously to most Latin 
American countries—the only exception being Colombia and Venezuela.  Indeed, seventy 
percent of the countries in Latin America are, according to our measure, affected by toil events 
in the United States.  In contrast, turmoil in the United States triggers an anomalous behavior in 
only 29 percent of the stock markets of Asian countries. The pattern of the spreading of problems 
in Japan is in sharp contrast to that observed for the United States.  In this case, Latin American 
markets do not react at all to turmoil in Japan, but 71 percent of the Asian countries experience 
anomalous returns when Japan posts an outsized return.  
Table 3 summarizes these results. Overall, shocks in financial centers are transmitted 
instantaneously to basically all (70 percent) mature markets (G-7 and European countries), 
whether the shock occurs in Germany, Japan, or the United States. These results are suggestive 
of the higher degree of integration of those markets. The regional characteristics of the 
transmission of the shocks to emerging economies are, however, different. U.S. shocks are 
strongly transmitted across Latin America; the shocks in Germany simultaneously affect stock 
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markets in Eastern Europe, Latin American, and Asia; while Japan turbulences mostly affect 
other Asian countries.  Interestingly, this pattern of transmission matches the pattern of exposure 
of financial institutions in Germany, Japan, and the United States to emerging economies as 
examined by Caroline van Rijckenghem and Beatrice Weder (2000). These authors classify bank 
lending to emerging economies by area of origin of those loans. They find that European banks 
are the largest creditors in all regions, with North American banks concentrating their lending in 
Latin America and Japanese banks mostly lending to other Asian countries.  In particular, at the 
onset of the Asian crisis, 32 percent of all the international loans to Asian countries originated in 
Japan, 44 percent originated in Europe, and just 10 percent originated in North America. Also, 
during 1997 and 1998, most lending to Eastern European (including Russia) countries originated 
in Western Europe (80 percent) while lending to Latin America originated in Western European 
banks (60 percent) and North American Banks (30 percent).  
Rijckenghem and Weder (2000) also examine the shifts in portfolios of European, North 
American, and Japanese banks during the Asian and Russian crises. Japanese banks consistently 
withdrew from Asia, reducing their lending from $124 billion in mid-1997 to $86 billion by the 
end of 1998, North American banks mainly shifted their lending among emerging markets during 
the Asian crisis (from Asia to Latin America and Europe) while they reduced their positions in 
all three regions during the Russian crisis.  European banks continued to build up their positions 
in all regions even after the onset of the Asian crisis and only during the first half of 1998 did 
they reduce their holdings in Asia, while increasing them in Latin American and Eastern Europe.  
The Russian crisis triggered the end of this expansionist investment strategy of European banks 
in emerging markets, with all banks reducing their exposure to all the three regions by about $20 
billion.  
Table 4 examines whether turmoil is transmitted from one country in the periphery to 
another country in the periphery or to financial centers. In particular, it examines the pattern of 
spillovers on days of turmoil of three crisis-prone countries in our sample: Brazil, Russia, and 
Thailand on a country-by-country basis. Table 5 summarizes the information. The patterns of 
globalization are similar for Brazil and Russia. Turbulence in those countries coincides with 
abnormal movements around the globe with the sole exception of Asia. Extreme movements in 
Thailand are not so-far reaching, in that they spill over only to other Asian economies. This 
evidence begs for an answer as to what are the channels through which these crisis-prone 
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countries with small asset markets have so-far reaching effects. To answer this question, we 
examine whether the days of turbulence in a particular crisis-prone emerging market were also 
days of turbulence in a financial center to which that particular country was associated with. We 
then examine whether problems in crisis-prone emerging markets not associated with turmoil in 
financial centers also have wide spillover effects. We chose financial centers according to the 
evidence discussed in the literature. We pair Brazil with the United States, Russia with Germany, 
and Thailand with Japan.  
Table 6 examines the periphery-to-periphery and periphery-center-periphery connections. 
Days of turmoil in crisis-prone emerging economies are divided in two samples, those on which 
the corresponding financial center was also roiled and those on which the corresponding 
financial center was not. The results are dramatically different. Turbulence in Brazil 
accompanied by turbulence in the United States is transmitted around the world, with Asia being 
the only region untouched. In contrast, turbulence in Brazil unaccompanied by turbulence in the 
United States only affects stock markets in Latin America. Turmoil in this case only has a 
regional reach. The same picture of propagation of shocks is observed in the case of Russian 
jitters. Turbulence becomes global if a financial center is affected but remains regional when the 
stock market in the financial center is calm. The evidence from Thailand is somewhat different. 
Again, simultaneous turmoil in the financial center (Japan) and Thailand triggers a broader 
propagation of shocks. But here this propagation is only regional in nature. There is not even 
regional propagation when turbulence affects only the stock market in Thailand.  The regional 
characteristics of some the turbulences in stock markets agree with the evidence from currency 
crises.6   
The question is what causes this regional pattern of spillovers.  Strong bilateral trade 
patterns may provide one explanation.  For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) point to the 
strong bilateral trade among Mercosur countries but caution that turmoil in Brazil is still 
transmitted rapidly to non-Mercosur Latin American countries.  Similarly, shocks from Russia 
are strongly transmitted to most of the transition economies even though bilateral trade links 
among transition economies diminished drastically in importance following the collapse of the 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989-1991.  Third party trade links may provide 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Gelos and Sahay (2000), Glick and  Rose (1998), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). 
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another explanation.  For example, Malaysia and Thailand sell similar goods to Japan and the 
United States, explaining the “contagion” from Thailand to Malaysia following the Thai 
devaluation in July 1997.  But the Mexican crisis in 1994 strongly affected Argentina and Brazil 
and these countries do not compete with Mexico on third markets.  Again financial links may 
help to explain regional contagion too.  For example, Graciela Kaminsky, Richard Lyons, and 
Sergio Schmukler (2002) examine investment strategies of U.S.-based mutual funds specialized 
in Latin America and find that they were a key element in explaining the reach of the Tequila 
crisis: as investors stampeded out of mutual funds specializing in Latin America following the 
Mexican devaluation, managers (under the pressure of the massive redemptions) had to sell not 
just Mexican stocks but also stocks from Argentina and Brazil. 
Table 7 summarizes these results by region and examines the null hypothesis of financial 
center irrelevance versus the alternative hypothesis that a financial center has to be affected for 
the turmoil to become systemic.  To examine this hypothesis, we construct the Wilcoxon, or 
rank-sum, test.  To construct this test, we look at the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
and construct two samples as follows.  The first sample captures the weak-form globalization 
pattern following turmoil in a crisis-prone emerging market coinciding with turmoil in a 
financial center.  For each j country in the sample, we assign a value equal to 1 if turmoil in the 
pair crisis-prone emerging-market and financial center triggers anomalous behavior in country j 
and zero otherwise. The second sample captures the weak-form globalization pattern following 
turmoil in a crisis-prone emerging market not coinciding with turmoil in a financial center. 
Again, for each j country in the sample, we assign a value equal to 1 if turmoil in just the crisis-
prone emerging market triggers anomalous behavior in country j and zero otherwise. Denote the 
observations from the first sample by {X} and the observations from the second sample by {Y}. 
The null hypothesis of financial center irrelevance implies that P(X>k)=P(Y>k) for all k. We are 
interested in the one-sided alternative that X is stochastically larger than Y, that is, 
P(X>k)>(Y>k) for all k.  To construct the rank-sum test, we rank all the observations without 
regard to the sample to which they belong. Then, the Wilcoxon test statistic is formed as the sum 
of the ranks in the first sample:  
W R i
i
n
=
=
∑ 1
1
                                                             (1) 
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where n is the number of countries in each sample. Under the null hypothesis, the average rank 
of an observation in sample 1 should equal the average rank of an observation in sample 2. Using 
the Fisher’s Principle of Randomization, it is straightforward to verify that: 
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W
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)= + =2 1
2 2
2
       and        Var(                                    (2) 
where s is the standard deviation of the combined ranks ri  for both samples: 
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                                                    (3) 
The last row of Table 7 shows the Wilcoxon test statistic for each sample and the one-sided p 
value for the null hypothesis of financial-center irrelevance. For example, for the case of Brazil, 
the proportion of all countries affected when both Brazil and the United States experience 
turmoil is 76 percent and the proportion of countries affected when just Brazil experiences 
turmoil is 24 percent. For these two samples, the Wilcoxon p-value under the null hypothesis of 
financial-center irrelevance is less than 0.01, leading us to reject the null hypothesis of financial 
center irrelevance.  The results for the other two emerging markets are similar.  In all cases, the 
tests reject the null hypothesis of financial-center irrelevance in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that a financial center has to be affected for turmoil to become systemic. 
 
2. Strong-Form Globalization  
 
In the previous section, we examined whether turmoil in one country triggers anomalous 
behavior in stock markets around the world, with anomalous behavior defined as a change in the 
distribution of returns.  Under this definition of globalization, other stock markets do not have to 
experience extreme returns in response to extreme returns in one stock market for globalization 
to occur.  A more stringent concept of globalization of turmoil would be one of simultaneous 
turmoil.   We call this definition of globalization of turmoil “strong-form globalization.” A 
globalization index in this case will just be the proportion of countries with simultaneous 
extreme events. Our task in this section is to examine the determinants of this index.   
To examine the causes of systemic events, we use a multinomial logit approach.   We 
also estimated the model using order logit techniques.  The results are quite similar, so we do not 
report them to save space.  Since we are interested in explaining the degree of globalization, our 
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left-hand variable will be a dummy variable that can take three values, low, medium, and high 
globalization.7   Low globalization occurs when less than 25 percent of the countries in the 
sample experience turmoil, medium globalization occurs when there are more than 25 percent 
but less than 50 percent of the countries in turmoil.  Finally, high globalization occurs when 50 
percent or more of all the countries experience turmoil. Our explanatory variables are dummy 
variables capturing days of turmoil in financial centers, days of turmoil in crisis-prone countries 
on days of turmoil in financial centers, and days of turmoil in crisis-prone countries when 
financial centers are not affected. These dummies will take a value of one on days of turmoil and 
zero otherwise.  Equation (4) is the multinomial logit equation to be estimated.  
P y i x xi i
i
j
( ) exp( ' ) / ( ' ))= = +
=
−∑β β1
1
1
                                                      (4)  
The variable y is the globalization index, and the vector x includes the dummy variables 
capturing turmoil in the various countries. The variable P(y = i) is the probability associated 
with outcome i. The index j refers to the number of outcomes in our estimation: low, medium, 
and high globalization. The vector β  is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. As is usual in 
this type of estimations for each explanatory variable, we estimate j-1 parameters. The 
probability that there is low globalization is our base case and it is equal to: 
P y x i
i
j
( ) / ( exp( ' ))= = +
=
−∑low 1 1
1
1
β                                                        (5) 
The estimation of equation (4) is somewhat problematic because not all the markets are open at 
the same time. Thus, a shock leading to turmoil in Brazil can affect all Latin American 
economies the same day, it can affect European economies the same day or the following day 
depending of the time at which the shock occurs, and can only affect Asian countries the 
following day.  Similarly, if a shock occurs in Russia, the index of globalization on the left-hand 
side has to include countries in turmoil in Europe, the G-7, and Latin America the same day and 
countries in turmoil in Asia the next day, but if the turmoil originates in Thailand, the index of 
                                                          
7 In Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) we constructed a similar index. In that paper, the index was the proportion of 
countries with currency crises, which was used to predict currency crises in other countries.  B. Kee-Hong, Andrew 
Karolyi, and Rene Stulz (2000) also look at simultaneous financial strains in Asia and Latin America and construct 
a similar index and find that contagion is predictable using a small set of macroeconomic variables. 
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globalization on the left hand side has to include the number of countries in turmoil in all the 
regions the same day of the shock.  
We deal with this problem in two different ways.  First, we estimate equation (4) using 
only turmoil originating in shocks from one time zone at a time. In this case, the left-hand-side 
variable is constructed depending on the origin of the shock and we estimate three separate 
versions of equation (4) for financial centers and three separate versions of equation (4) for 
crisis-prone emerging markets. The shortcoming of this type of estimation is that we cannot 
evaluate jointly the effects of extreme events in the various crisis-prone countries and financial 
centers.  
Second, to account for the effect of turbulence in the three crisis-prone countries jointly, 
we perform panel estimations. To deal with the different time zones, the index of globalization in 
the left-hand side accounts for low, medium, and high globalization by region. For each region, 
we align the explanatory variables on the right-hand side according to the region they may affect. 
Since we estimate the regression for all the regions at the same time, the parameters β  provide a 
somewhat different measure of the effects of turmoil in the various countries on globalization. 
For example, the episodes of high globalization are more confining in the sense that they require 
all the regions to have a high degree of globalization simultaneously. This was not the case in the 
non-panel estimation.  
Finally, within the panel regression estimates, we jointly evaluate the effects of 
coincidence of multiple shocks in emerging markets and financial centers. We construct two 
dummy variables. The first one captures days of turmoil in emerging markets coinciding with 
turmoil in financial centers. This variable can take four values, zero to three. If this variable 
takes the value three, it means that the three crisis-prone emerging economies experience turmoil 
and so do their respective financial centers. The second explanatory variable in this regression 
will capture the number of crisis-prone emerging markets in turmoil when there is no turmoil in 
financial centers. Again, this variable can take four values, zero to three.  
Tables 8 and 9 examine the effects of turmoil originating in one time zone at a time. 
Table 8 concentrates on turmoil originating in financial centers. The first equation has as 
explanatory variable a dummy variable equal to one when Germany experiences turmoil and 
zero otherwise.  The second regression has as explanatory variable a dummy variable equal to 
one when Japan experiences turmoil and zero otherwise.  Finally, the third equation has as 
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explanatory dummy variable a dummy variable equal to one when United States experiences 
turmoil and zero otherwise.  Table 9 uses the same methodology to evaluate the degree of 
globalization following jitters in one turmoil cluster at a time: Brazil-U.S., Russia-Germany, and 
Thailand-Japan. For each turmoil cluster, the regression has two explanatory dummy variables.  
One dummy variable is equal to one on days of turbulences in the emerging market coinciding 
with days of turmoil in the corresponding financial center and zero otherwise.  The second 
explanatory dummy variable is equal to one on days of turbulences in the emerging market not 
accompanied by turmoil in the corresponding financial center and zero otherwise.  To evaluate 
jointly the contribution of these clusters to the globalization of turmoil, we estimate a 
multivariate turmoil-cluster panel regression. We estimate the model using panel data because of 
the time-zone problem. The results are reported in Table 10. Finally, Table 11 reports the panel 
estimation evaluating the effects of multiple coincidence of turmoil in the three crisis-prone 
emerging markets. The top panels in all these tables report the estimated coefficients while the 
bottom panels show the conditional probabilities of globalization obtained from the estimations 
shown in the top panels.  
As for the results, Table 8 shows that turmoil in financial centers triggers turbulences 
around the world, with the explanatory power (as captured by the pseudo R 2 ) ranging from 9 
percent for turmoil originating in Japan to 19 percent for turmoil originating in Germany.  Again, 
this pattern could be explained, in part, by the higher worldwide exposure of German banks to 
emerging markets in Asia, Latin America, and Transition economies during the late 1990s.  The 
bottom panel provides another metric to capture the reach of turmoil in the three financial 
centers: the probability of low, medium, and high globalization conditional on turmoil in each 
financial center, derived from the multinomial estimation.  Again the likelihood of medium to 
high globalization on days of turmoil in Germany is about 60 percent, but only about 40 percent 
when shocks originate in Japan, with market jitters in the United States triggering medium-to-
high globalization with a probability of almost 50 percent.   
Table 9 reports the results for turmoil originating in emerging markets. The first three 
columns report the estimates for Brazil, the next three for Russia, and the last three for Thailand. 
As we did when we evaluated weak forms of globalization, we pay particular attention to 
whether days of turmoil in the three crisis-prone emerging markets coincide with days of turmoil 
or with days of no turmoil in financial centers. Financial centers would be irrelevant in 
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explaining high degrees of globalization of turmoil if the coefficient β  attached to the dummy 
capturing turmoil in the cluster emerging market-financial center is not statistically different 
from the coefficient β  attached to the dummy capturing turmoil in just the emerging market.  
This hypothesis is tested in the third column for each emerging market.  In all cases, we reject 
this hypothesis at all conventional significance levels.  To better understand the effects of 
turmoil in the various countries, the bottom panel of Table 9 also reports the conditional 
probabilities of low, medium, and high globalization obtained from the estimation of equation 
(4). The results for Brazil indicate that low globalization is the most likely outcome when 
turbulence in Brazil does not coincide with turbulence in a financial center.  In contrast, when 
the financial center is also experiencing an extreme event, high globalization becomes the most 
likely event, with the probability reaching 57 percent.  Interestingly, if there is no turmoil in 
Brazil or the United States, the likelihood of a high clustering of countries with turmoil collapses 
to 2 percent.  The results for Russia are quite similar.  Again the necessary ingredient for high 
globalization is the coincidence of turmoil in Russia and Germany. In this case, the average 
probability of high globalization is about 50 percent but declines to 2 percent when only Russia 
experiences turbulence.  The results for Thailand indicate that the reach of the Asian crisis was 
limited in scope.  Still, jitters in Thailand are transmitted to other Asian countries only on days of 
jitters in Japan.  The explanatory power of these shocks, as captured by the pseudo R 2  is high for 
Brazil and Russia but, as expected, quite small for Thailand. 
To evaluate jointly the effects of turmoil in the three emerging markets and financial 
centers, we report the panel estimates in Tables 10 and 11.   As shown in Table 10, each of the 
three emerging-market-financial center clusters contribute to trigger financial turmoil worldwide, 
as captured by the statistically significant β  coefficients of the three crisis-cluster dummies for 
the high globalization event.  Still, the contribution of the Thailand-Japan cluster is somewhat 
smaller. Our panel estimation, though, has a smaller predictive power than the non-panel 
estimations on account of the restrictions imposing similar effects of turmoil of the various 
center-periphery clusters across the five regions.  Our more stringent definition of high 
globalization episodes is also reflected in lower probabilities of high globalization following 
turbulences in the three center-periphery clusters.    
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Finally, the results in Table 11 bring to the spotlight the magnification effect of 
simultaneous turbulences in several center-periphery clusters. Note that the probability of high 
globalization now increases to 94 percent when the three crisis clusters experience turbulences 
but just 13 percent when one crisis cluster is in turmoil. Note that the probability of high 
globalization on days of no turmoil in any of the crisis clusters is just 1 percent. 
 
IV. The Origins of Globalization 
  
In the previous section, we evaluated the odds of simultaneous turbulence around the 
world when crisis-prone emerging markets and financial centers were experiencing turmoil. We 
did not explain the origin of these turbulences. To do that, we have to bring in information 
beyond that on daily movements in equity prices. Our source is the written record: We used 
reports from Bloomberg, the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal to construct a 
chronology of news in those days. We limit our search to days on which at least 50 percent of 
countries in one region have stock market jitters. This chronology is reported in the Appendix 
Table. The first column dates the days of regional and global turmoil. The next six columns 
report the proportion of countries worldwide and by region with stock market turmoil. For 
clarity, we just report the proportion of markets in turmoil when it reaches more than 50 percent 
of the countries worldwide or in each region. The last column reports the news. To study the 
onset and propagation of turmoil, it is important to collect all news, local and foreign, triggering 
jitters. This news can be about the state of the economy, financial institutions, policies, and just 
plain rumors. The Appendix Table does not report all the news events that move markets on a 
particular day, it just reports the most common source of market jitters in the region or around 
the world.  
As shown in this chronology, the first day of worldwide turmoil is October 27, 1997, 
with 60 percent of the countries around the globe experiencing turmoil.  The tension started to 
build up towards the end of August. Until that time, while several Asian countries experienced 
turbulences, they did not spread to other countries in that region.  But on August 28, 1997, 
financial markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong collapsed 
amid a deepening loss of confidence in the ability of governments to tackle their severe 
economic problems.  Again, on October 22, turmoil reached Hong Kong and spread in Asia, with 
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about 60 percent of the Asian countries experiencing market crashes. The crisis in Hong Kong 
deepened and on October 23, it triggered a global sell off in Europe, the G-7 countries, and Latin 
America. By October 27, worldwide globalization reached about 60 percent of the countries in 
the sample.  This time around, the globalization of the turmoil was short-lived and within two 
days markets rebounded, with massive rallies around the world. 
December 11 is the next day of significant inter-regional spillover, with Korea at the 
center of the debacle in Asia and Europe. Still, repercussions in the G-7 countries were minor. 
Another day of inter-regional turmoil was January 12, 1998. At the heart of the jitters was the 
collapse of Peregrine (Hong Kong), one of Asia’s largest investment banks and according to 
journalists’ accounts “raising concerns about emerging markets in general.” 
The next cluster of global instability started towards the end of May 1998, with Russian 
tension spreading to Latin America, transition economies, Asia, Europe, and the G-7 countries. 
The degree of globalization rapidly rose, reaching about 50 percent of countries worldwide by 
June 15.  Rumors of devaluation in China and weakness of the Japanese economy and the yen 
also contributed to the build up of skittishness. The degree of globalization reached 60 percent 
on August 11.  On August 21, shares of German banks heavily exposed to Russia collapsed 
triggering downfalls in other G-7 countries. On August 27, the failed auction of Russian GKOs 
reignited fears of financial collapse, bringing major downturns in 75 percent countries 
worldwide. Financial turmoil griped Latin American markets following Moody’s downgrade of 
Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign debt while putting Argentina’s debt and 11 banks on review 
for a possible downgrade on September 3. While markets in some regions rebounded during the 
first week of September, financial concerns, brought again to the limelight by the S&P’s 
downgrade of Spain’s second largest bank (with heavy exposure to Argentina) and of 
Argentina’s two largest banks on September 10, together with LTCM’s collapse and bailout on 
September 24, triggered stock market crashes around the world. This episode of worldwide 
financial instability came to an end with news of credit easing in financial centers related 
importantly to the inter-meeting reduction in the federal funds interest rate on October 15 in the 
United States.  
The last episode of financial instability in our sample occurred around the time of the 
devaluation of the Brazilian real, which was extremely short-lived.  Only on January 13, did 
financial markets around the world collapse.   
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Table 12 summarizes our findings about the news that rocked financial markets. But first, 
the top panel shows the proportion of days of rallies and days of crashes during episodes of high 
regional and world globalization (at least 50 percent of countries affected by turmoil). Note that 
85 percent of the episodes of high world globalization involve stock market crashes. Episodes of 
high regional globalization are more balanced. With the exception of the Asian region, in which 
days of joint rallies outnumber days of simultaneous crashes, about 60 percent of the days of 
high regional globalization consist of crashes.  The middle panel classifies the days of high 
globalization, both at a regional level and worldwide, according to the type of news that seems to 
have triggered the spillover.  Financial concerns from bankruptcies of large banks or adverse 
shocks in one or more asset market in a center country seem to be at the core of high worldwide 
globalization (40 percent of the episodes).  Only 20 percent of the days of high spillovers seem 
to be driven by economic, political, and monetary news at the center.  Another important source 
of instability is concerns about financial fragility in the periphery (25 percent of the episodes).  
In contrast, financial worries in center countries only account for 26 percent of the episodes of 
high regional globalization.  Financial fragility in the periphery seems to be at the heart of 
regional turbulences (31 percent of the episodes).  Finally, international agreements also 
contribute to regional turbulences.   
One final aspect of globalization that we have still not addressed is whether high 
globalization occurs when the magnitude of the shocks in the stock market is larger. The bottom 
panel addresses this question. We first divide extreme returns in three categories according to 
their size: large (within the 1-percent critical-region on both tails), medium (between the 1-
percent and 3-percent critical-region on both tails) and small (between the 3-percent and 5-
percent critical-region). Afterwards, we estimate the average size of the returns for all the 
countries in turmoil for each episode of low, medium, and high world globalization. The bottom 
panel in Table 12 shows the proportion of episodes of low, medium, and high world 
globalization with small, medium, and large returns. Larger (in absolute values) returns are more 
common in days of high globalization: all the shocks in episodes of high globalization are 
clustered in at the most the 3 percent critical region while during episodes of low globalization 
46 percent of the shocks are relatively small (between 3 percent and 5 percent critical region).  
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V. Concluding Comments  
  
This paper presents a new approach to measure and understand systemic financial 
turbulences.  We defined two measures of systemic disturbances: weak- and strong-form 
globalization and created the corresponding indices of “globalization.” These indices allowed us 
to capture the routes through which market jitters in one country reach other countries in the 
same region or even worldwide.  They also allowed us to estimate the likelihood of low to high 
globalization following a variety of shocks in crisis-prone emerging markets and financial 
centers.  One of the preliminary conclusions we draw from this exercise is that financial centers 
are at the core of “systemic” problems:  The “worldwide globalization” of the turbulences in 
Asia in the Fall of 1997 only occurred after the stock market crash in the United States on 
October 27, while the Russian downfall spread around the globe only after it triggered fragilities 
in German banks and helped to provoke LTCM’s bankruptcy.  Without distress in a financial 
center, disturbances spread at most regionally, with the “silk road” of regional financial distress 
being in part related to trade links but also to financial linkages.  For example, as documented in 
Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2002), the 1994 Mexican crisis spread so rapidly to 
Argentina and Brazil via the mutual funds (specialized in Latin America) massive withdrawals 
from those two countries.   Finally, our evidence indicates that collapses and not rallies are at the 
heart of high-globalization episodes, suggesting the need for models with asymmetries to explain 
systemic turmoil.  
Our research has focused on explaining the “geographical” extent of financial turmoil, 
still the “temporal” dimension of high-globalization episodes of turbulences varies as much, with 
some episodes lasting just a couple of days (Sell-off in stock markets around the world following 
the Hong Kong collapse in October 1997) while others, such as the turmoil during the Fall of 
1998, lingered much longer.  Also, our research, as most of the previous literature, has just 
focused on a particular asset market.  But the degree of systemic problems should not only be 
understood as synchronized jitters across a particular asset market in a variety of countries, but 
also as simultaneous turmoil across markets in a particular country.  Future research should 
inquire into these differences too.   
 
 21
References 
  
Bae, Kee-Hong, Andrew G. Karoyli, and Rene M. Stulz, (2003) “A New Approach to Measuring 
Financial Contagion,” Review of Financial Studies, Volume 16, issue 3, pages 717-63. 
 
Bank for International Settlements, (1999), A Review of Financial Market Events in Autumn  
1998, (Basle, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements), October. 
  
Calvo, Guillermo, (1998). “Capital Market Contagion and Recession: An Explanation of the 
Russian Virus,” mimeo, University of Maryland. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A., Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1993), “Capital Flows and 
Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors,” IMF 
Staff Papers, Volume 40, No. 1, March. 
  
Calvo, Guillermo A., Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1996). “Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries in the 1990s: Causes and Effects”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 10, Spring, 123-139. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo and Enrique Mendoza, (2000), “Rational Contagion and the Globalization of 
Securities,” Journal of International Economics, Volume 51, issue 1, pages 79-113. 
  
Calvo, Sara and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1996). “Capital Flows to Latin America: Is There 
Evidence of Contagion Effects?” in Guillermo A. Calvo, Morris Goldstein, and Eduard 
Hochreitter (eds.) Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, (Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics). 
  
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, Nouriel Roubini, Cedric Tille, (1998). “Structural Links and 
Contagion Effects in the Asian Crisis: A Welfare Based Approach,” mimeo, Yale 
University. 
 
Danielsson, J. and C. de Vries, (1997), “Value-at-Risk and Extreme Returns,” London School of 
Economics Working Paper.  
 
De Bandt, Olivier and Philipp Hartmann, (2000). “Systemic Risk: A Survey,” European Central 
Bank Working Paper Series, November. 
  
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew Rose and Charles Wyplosz, (1996). “Contagious Currency Crises,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5681. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey and Sergio Schmukler, (1998) “Crises, Contagion, and Country Funds: Effects 
on East Asia and Latin America,” in Reuven Glick (ed.), Managing Capital Flows and 
Exchange Rates: Perspectives from the Pacific Basin, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), pages 232-266. 
 
 22
Gelos, Gastón and Ratna Sahay, (2000), “Financial Market Spillovers in Transition Economies,” 
IMF Working Paper WP/00/71 
  
Glick, Reuven and Andrew Rose, (1998). “Contagion and Trade: Why are Currency Crises 
Regional?” NBER Working Paper No. 6806. 
 
Hartman Philippe S. Straetmans and C. de Vries, “Asset Market Linkages in Crisis Periods,” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, February, Volume 86, issue 1, pages 313-26 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1999). “The Twin Crises: The Causes of 
Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,” American Economic Review. 
  
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart, 2000, “On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion,” 
Journal of International Economics. 
  
Kaminsky, Graciela L., and Carmen M. Reinhart, 2001, “Bank Lending and Contagion: 
Evidence from the Asian Crisis,” in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Regional and Global 
Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press for the NBER). 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela, Richard Lyons, and Sergio Schmukler, 2002, “Managers, Investors, and 
Crises: Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging Markets,” World Bank Working Paper. 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela, Richard Lyons, and Sergio Schmukler, 2001, Economic Fragility, 
Liquidity, and Risk: The Behavior of Mutual Funds during Crises,” World Bank Working 
Paper. 
 
King, Mervyn, Enrique Sentana, and Sushil Wadhawani, (1994) “Volatility and Links between 
National Stock Markets,” Econometrica, Volume 62, issue 4, pages 901-933. 
 
Lin, Wen-Ling, Robert Engle, and Takatoshi Ito, (1994), “Do Bulls and Bears Move Across 
Borders? International Transmission of Stock Returns and Volatility,” Review of 
Financial Studies, Volume 7, issue 3, pages 507-538 
   
Longin, F. M., (1996), “The Asymptotic Distribution of Extreme Stock Market Returns,” 
Journal of Business, 69, 383-408. 
 
Mati, Amine, (2001), “Extreme Returns: News and Patterns of Contagion,” George Washington 
University, mimeo.  
 
Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Beatrice Weder, (2000). “Financial Contagion: Spillovers 
through Banking Centers”, mimeo, IMF Working Paper. 
Figure 1. The Transmission of Shocks from One Periphery Country to Another 
 
                                                                                                                                         
                          
          
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
 
 
       
                                                                                     
 
 
Figure 2. The Transmission of Shocks from one Periphery Country to Another  
                                           Through a Center Country 
 
 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
 
Figure 3. Symmetric Shocks from Center to Periphery 
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5th 95th
HONG KONG 1.40 -3.39 3.17
INDONESIA 1.62 -3.94 4.51
KOREA 1.96 -4.43 5.32
MALAYSIA 1.72 -3.63 3.78
PHILIPPINES 1.41 -3.26 3.46
SINGAPORE 1.30 -2.89 3.00
THAILAND 1.78 -3.49 4.74
GREECE 1.59 -3.32 3.62
FINLAND 1.31 -2.79 2.82
HOLLAND 1.16 -2.42 2.46
NORWAY 1.00 -2.29 2.18
SPAIN 1.03 -2.13 2.29
SWEDEN 0.98 -2.16 2.00
TURKEY 2.49 -5.75 5.82
CANADA 0.71 -1.63 1.49
FRANCE 0.90 -2.02 2.01
ITALY 1.26 -2.61 2.88
GERMANY 1.20 -2.54 2.27
JAPAN 0.93 -1.99 2.20
UK 0.86 -1.90 1.86
USA 0.87 -1.80 1.90
ARGENTINA 1.60 -4.31 3.41
BRAZIL 2.13 -4.84 4.31
CHILE 1.03 -2.24 2.42
COLOMBIA 0.83 -2.01 2.17
MEXICO 1.35 -2.78 3.23
PERU 1.01 -2.15 2.33
VENEZUELA 1.55 -3.98 3.48
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.94 -2.30 2.10
ESTONIA 1.84 -4.00 4.54
HUNGARY 1.63 -3.48 3.48
POLAND 1.35 -3.02 3.03
RUSSIA 2.49 -5.10 6.48
SLOVAKIA 0.97 -2.49 2.38
UKRAINE 2.07 -5.18 5.42
Notes: The sample extends from January 1,1997 to August 31,1999.
           Mean is the average of one-day percent returns in absolute values.
Countries Mean Percentiles
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Stock Market Returns in Domestic Currency
5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th
HONG KONG 1.40 -3.39 3.17 2.08 -4.92 5.07 0.44 2.60 -6.61 7.41 ** 2.40 -3.92 7.01 **
INDONESIA 1.62 -3.94 4.51 2.55 -5.24 7.41 ** 2.74 -4.76 7.30 *** 2.17 -4.84 7.12 ***
KOREA 1.96 -4.43 5.32 2.22 -4.97 6.35 0.98 2.81 -5.52 7.26 *** 2.41 -5.45 6.87 0.76
MALAYSIA 1.72 -3.63 3.78 2.38 -4.80 5.89 ** 2.63 -5.37 5.71 0.06 2.58 -6.15 9.09 0.52
PHILIPPINES 1.41 -3.26 3.46 2.23 -5.54 4.21 *** 2.00 -4.95 5.83 ** 1.84 -4.86 4.31 0.51
SINGAPORE 1.30 -2.89 3.00 1.95 -4.66 4.23 0.18 2.27 -3.93 7.00 *** 1.85 -3.62 3.85 0.23
THAILAND 1.78 -3.49 4.74 2.09 -4.05 6.10 0.69 2.38 -3.94 8.16 0.47 1.83 -3.54 7.52 0.21
GREECE 1.59 -3.32 3.62 2.06 -6.13 3.60 0.06 2.17 -6.12 5.07 0.10 2.39 -5.57 4.93 0.06
FINLAND 1.31 -2.79 2.82 3.07 -5.67 5.05 *** 2.20 -4.85 4.67 *** 2.11 -4.79 5.10 **
HOLLAND 1.16 -2.42 2.46 2.77 -5.21 4.89 *** 1.75 -3.85 3.80 ** 1.69 -4.54 3.33 **
NORWAY 1.00 -2.29 2.18 2.49 -5.39 5.05 *** 1.68 -4.95 5.05 ** 1.53 -4.64 4.44 **
SPAIN 1.03 -2.13 2.29 2.40 -6.03 5.12 *** 1.58 -4.79 4.01 ** 1.31 -3.69 3.78 0.30
SWEDEN 0.98 -2.16 2.00 2.18 -4.34 3.21 *** 1.74 -4.07 3.28 *** 1.47 -3.71 3.31 **
TURKEY 2.49 -5.75 5.82 3.74 -10.12 9.26 0.06 3.56 -10.12 8.78 0.12 3.45 -8.85 9.89 **
CANADA 0.71 -1.63 1.49 1.36 -3.72 2.75 *** 0.93 -2.04 1.67 0.07 1.83 -3.72 2.90 ***
FRANCE 0.90 -2.02 2.01 2.22 -4.29 4.45 *** 1.42 -3.94 3.47 *** 1.23 -3.34 3.11 0.15
ITALY 1.26 -2.61 2.88 2.59 -5.63 5.29 *** 2.02 -5.23 4.48 ** 1.61 -4.33 4.96 **
GERMANY 1.20 -2.54 2.27 3.57 -5.87 5.17 *** 1.88 -4.67 4.21 ** 1.90 -5.35 3.94 ***
JAPAN 0.93 -1.99 2.20 1.20 -3.07 2.84 ** 2.95 -4.15 4.37 *** 1.19 -2.79 2.77 0.62
UK 0.86 -1.90 1.86 1.79 -3.25 3.32 *** 1.23 -2.96 2.67 ** 1.19 -3.06 3.00 **
USA 0.87 -1.80 1.90 1.39 -3.42 3.10 0.18 0.97 -2.06 2.12 0.28 2.60 -3.73 4.02 ***
ARGENTINA 1.60 -4.31 3.41 2.98 -10.44 5.76 0.06 2.14 -6.40 4.94 0.52 3.51 -9.17 8.13 ***
BRAZIL 2.13 -4.84 4.31 3.73 -9.77 8.07 ** 2.73 -9.71 4.72 0.32 4.76 -10.08 10.34 ***
CHILE 1.03 -2.24 2.42 1.71 -5.04 3.23 ** 1.05 -2.79 2.39 0.43 1.78 -4.69 3.55 **
COLOMBIA 0.83 -2.01 2.17 0.89 -2.38 2.30 0.79 1.04 -2.28 3.93 0.11 0.88 -2.42 1.95 0.88
MEXICO 1.35 -2.78 3.23 2.67 -6.05 5.29 ** 1.98 -4.79 4.20 0.09 2.95 -6.05 7.17 ***
PERU 1.01 -2.15 2.33 1.85 -5.75 4.58 *** 1.29 -3.02 2.88 0.29 1.66 -4.70 3.97 **
VENEZUELA 1.55 -3.98 3.48 2.25 -7.51 4.32 0.26 1.72 -5.09 2.32 0.06 2.04 -6.20 3.77 0.13
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.94 -2.30 2.10 1.62 -4.28 2.82 *** 1.18 -2.99 2.09 0.14 1.31 -3.48 2.33 **
ESTONIA 1.84 -4.00 4.54 2.80 -8.35 8.25 0.16 2.97 -11.31 9.09 0.09 2.38 -8.35 5.36 0.43
HUNGARY 1.63 -3.48 3.48 3.48 -10.03 4.94 *** 3.47 -10.76 8.63 ** 3.26 -10.76 9.10 ***
POLAND 1.35 -3.02 3.03 2.34 -6.02 5.28 *** 2.42 -6.41 4.81 0.09 2.90 -6.60 6.53 ***
RUSSIA 2.49 -5.10 6.48 4.73 -10.80 14.98 *** 3.82 -10.11 7.46 0.10 4.19 -12.49 14.67 0.07
SLOVAKIA 0.97 -2.49 2.38 1.09 -3.13 2.35 0.71 0.96 -2.56 1.82 0.30 0.83 -2.58 1.94 0.37
UKRAINE 2.07 -5.18 5.42 3.15 -12.20 6.06 0.08 3.10 -11.07 8.09 0.13 3.02 -8.63 7.04 0.26
Notes: Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.  Mean is the average  of one day percent returns in absolute values. The Kolmogorov Smirnov Test evaluates whether
             the frequency distribution on days of turmoil in the corresponding financial center is different from the frequency distribution on all other days.   5th and 95th percentiles report the 
            the values of stock market returns at those percentiles.  The sample extends from January 1,1997 to August 31,1999.  ***,** represent the significance of the Kolmogorov Smirnov Test at the 1 
            and 5 percent level respectively.
Table 2
K&S       
p-valuemean
K&S        
p-valuemean
Percentiles
mean
Percentiles Percentiles
mean
COUNTRIES
Turmoil in Financial Centers: How Does It Spread?
Percentiles K&S      
p-value
Empirical Distribution of Stock Market Returns
ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN USAON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN GERMANY ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN JAPANON ALL DAYS
GERMANY JAPAN USA
Asia 43 71 29
Europe 71 71 71
G7 100 75 75
Latin America 43 0 71
Transition Economies 57 14 43
World 59 44 56
Notes: Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.
An anomalous return is interpreted as a change in the distribution of returns in country j on days of turmoil in country i .
Table 3
Weak-Form Globalization of Turmoil
Regional and World Effects
REGIONS Percentage of Countries with Anomalous Returns when Turmoil in
5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th
HONG KONG 1.40 -3.39 3.17 2.41 -4.82 7.41 0.32 2.05 -3.26 6.84 0.17 2.45 -4.52 6.84 ***
INDONESIA 1.62 -3.94 4.51 2.50 -5.15 6.77 ** 2.32 -5.15 6.47 0.30 2.89 -5.03 8.00 **
KOREA 1.96 -4.43 5.32 2.60 -5.65 6.76 0.37 2.18 -4.97 4.91 0.49 2.35 -5.66 7.39 0.87
MALAYSIA 1.72 -3.63 3.78 2.52 -4.73 9.42 0.68 2.85 -4.53 11.80 ** 2.81 -5.86 6.91 0.12
PHILIPPINES 1.41 -3.26 3.46 2.09 -5.28 4.80 0.12 2.19 -6.01 3.98 *** 2.46 -4.84 6.80 **
SINGAPORE 1.30 -2.89 3.00 2.13 -3.58 5.92 0.09 1.94 -3.30 7.00 0.24 2.35 -3.84 7.62 **
THAILAND 1.78 -3.49 4.74 2.18 -4.05 7.52 0.31 2.05 -3.51 5.96 0.69 5.71 -6.33 10.42 ***
GREECE 1.59 -3.32 3.62 2.20 -4.99 5.50 ** 2.23 -6.02 3.85 *** 1.89 -5.53 4.02 0.26
FINLAND 1.31 -2.79 2.82 2.14 -4.85 4.36 *** 2.42 -5.59 4.50 *** 1.71 -4.81 3.31 0.74
HOLLAND 1.16 -2.42 2.46 1.89 -5.00 3.38 *** 1.82 -5.21 2.68 *** 1.32 -3.15 2.50 0.29
NORWAY 1.00 -2.29 2.18 1.99 -4.95 4.57 *** 2.11 -5.23 3.92 *** 1.61 -4.73 3.88 0.08
SPAIN 1.03 -2.13 2.29 1.61 -4.74 3.78 ** 1.67 -6.03 3.06 *** 1.16 -3.09 2.54 0.58
SWEDEN 0.98 -2.16 2.00 1.69 -3.61 3.17 *** 1.61 -4.07 2.09 *** 1.22 -2.79 2.09 0.31
TURKEY 2.49 -5.75 5.82 3.73 -9.25 8.78 *** 4.29 -10.99 9.86 *** 3.12 -8.23 7.98 0.65
CANADA 0.71 -1.63 1.49 1.32 -3.32 2.29 *** 1.19 -3.18 2.46 ** 0.94 -1.90 2.13 **
FRANCE 0.90 -2.02 2.01 1.38 -3.34 2.94 *** 1.51 -4.29 2.55 *** 0.99 -3.08 2.20 0.69
ITALY 1.26 -2.61 2.88 2.02 -4.33 4.96 ** 2.08 -5.63 3.22 *** 1.39 -3.91 2.86 0.33
GERMANY 1.20 -2.54 2.27 2.01 -5.54 3.94 ** 2.05 -5.68 3.51 *** 1.58 -4.32 3.35 0.38
JAPAN 0.93 -1.99 2.20 1.37 -3.00 3.76 0.24 1.18 -2.55 3.03 0.61 1.25 -3.22 3.56 0.25
UK 0.86 -1.90 1.86 1.29 -3.13 3.00 *** 1.52 -3.14 2.69 *** 0.99 -2.03 2.89 0.11
USA 0.87 -1.80 1.90 1.72 -3.32 3.70 *** 1.31 -2.80 4.02 0.23 1.01 -2.13 2.18 0.13
ARGENTINA 1.60 -4.31 3.41 4.58 -10.44 8.51 *** 3.32 -10.44 7.41 ** 2.23 -4.15 6.09 0.12
BRAZIL 2.13 -4.84 4.31 7.67 -10.09 12.19 *** 3.89 -10.08 7.66 ** 2.56 -5.19 6.72 0.20
CHILE 1.03 -2.24 2.42 2.25 -5.04 4.34 *** 1.58 -5.04 2.53 0.16 1.28 -2.86 3.36 0.09
COLOMBIA 0.83 -2.01 2.17 1.10 -3.74 2.02 ** 0.91 -3.11 1.88 ** 0.88 -2.08 2.47 0.40
MEXICO 1.35 -2.78 3.23 3.21 -6.05 8.43 *** 2.58 -5.57 6.40 ** 1.80 -3.76 4.59 0.26
PERU 1.01 -2.15 2.33 1.93 -5.64 3.84 *** 1.63 -5.11 3.78 ** 1.21 -2.47 3.51 **
VENEZUELA 1.55 -3.98 3.48 2.63 -7.51 3.85 *** 2.03 -6.65 3.08 ** 1.85 -4.55 3.67 0.32
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.94 -2.30 2.10 1.61 -3.70 2.81 *** 1.83 -3.93 3.13 *** 0.98 -2.21 2.06 0.96
ESTONIA 1.84 -4.00 4.54 3.04 -10.49 7.01 *** 3.54 -10.49 8.64 *** 2.37 -6.98 5.74 0.37
HUNGARY 1.63 -3.48 3.48 3.65 -10.51 9.32 *** 3.61 -10.76 5.91 *** 2.18 -6.02 3.47 0.48
POLAND 1.35 -3.02 3.03 2.61 -5.74 6.00 *** 2.45 -6.27 4.66 *** 1.98 -5.00 3.75 0.06
RUSSIA 2.49 -5.10 6.48 4.75 -12.49 13.85 ** 9.74 -17.49 16.71 *** 3.46 -7.35 8.56 0.31
SLOVAKIA 0.97 -2.49 2.38 0.97 -3.04 2.68 0.94 1.19 -3.10 2.52 ** 1.14 -3.07 2.90 0.47
UKRAINE 2.07 -5.18 5.42 4.37 -10.94 8.99 *** 3.27 -11.56 8.37 0.16 2.37 -6.24 8.56 0.96
Notes: Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.  Mean is the average  of one day percent returns in absolute values. The Kolmogorov Smirnov Test (K&S) evaluates whether
             the frequency distribution on days of turmoil in the corresponding emerging market is different from the frequency distribution on all other days.   5th and 95th percentiles report the 
            the values of stock market returns at those percentiles.  The sample extends from January 1,1997 to August 31,1999.  ***,** represent the significance of the Kolmogorov Smirnov Test at the 1 
            and 5 percent level respectively.
K&S        
p-valuemean
Percentiles mean PercentilesK&S       p-value mean
Percentiles K&S        
p-value
Table 4
Turmoil in Emerging Markets: How Does It Spread?
COUNTRIES
Empirical Distribution of Stock Market Returns
ON ALL DAYS ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN BRAZIL ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN RUSSIA ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN THAILAND
mean Percentiles
BRAZIL RUSSIA THAILAND
Asia 14 29 67
Europe 100 100 0
G7 83 67 17
Latin America 100 86 14
Transition Economies 86 83 0
World 76 73 18
Notes: A turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.
An anomalous return is interpreted as a change in the distribution of returns in country j  on days of turmoil in country i .
Table 5
Regional and World Effects
Percentage of Countries with Anomalous Returns when Turmoil in
Weak-Form Globalization of Turmoil
REGIONS
5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th 5th 95th
HONG KONG 1.40 -3.39 3.17 2.41 -4.82 7.41 0.32 1.67 -4.38 5.53 0.74 2.05 -3.26 6.84 0.17 1.78 -3.10 6.95 0.11 2.45 -4.52 6.84 *** 1.96 -4.51 5.55 0.13
INDONESIA 1.62 -3.94 4.51 2.50 -5.15 6.77 ** 2.00 -4.02 6.26 0.34 2.32 -5.15 6.47 0.30 1.79 -3.44 5.83 0.56 2.89 -5.03 8.00 ** 2.13 -4.28 5.75 0.72
KOREA 1.96 -4.43 5.32 2.60 -5.65 6.76 0.37 2.23 -5.65 6.76 0.82 2.18 -4.97 4.91 0.49 2.14 -3.94 5.08 0.13 2.35 -5.66 7.39 0.87 2.00 -5.66 7.39 0.69
MALAYSIA 1.72 -3.63 3.78 2.52 -4.73 9.42 0.68 2.49 -3.75 14.94 0.92 2.85 -4.53 11.80 ** 2.74 -4.68 9.98 ** 2.81 -5.86 6.91 0.12 2.15 -4.05 4.36 0.48
PHILIPPINES 1.41 -3.26 3.46 2.09 -5.28 4.80 0.12 1.68 -4.60 3.11 0.12 2.19 -6.01 3.98 *** 1.79 -4.49 3.95 0.58 2.46 -4.84 6.80 ** 1.99 -4.43 5.97 0.34
SINGAPORE 1.30 -2.89 3.00 2.13 -3.58 5.92 0.09 1.73 -3.21 4.92 0.36 1.94 -3.30 7.00 0.24 1.62 -3.30 6.22 0.15 2.35 -3.84 7.62 ** 1.80 -3.82 5.56 0.36
THAILAND 1.78 -3.49 4.74 2.18 -4.05 7.52 0.31 1.97 -3.95 6.36 0.77 2.05 -3.51 5.96 0.69 2.29 -3.47 7.44 0.77 5.71 -6.33 10.42 *** 5.59 -6.76 10.74 ***
GREECE 1.59 -3.32 3.62 2.20 -4.99 5.50 ** 1.64 -4.00 3.47 0.13 2.23 -6.02 3.85 *** 1.71 -3.86 3.95 0.70 1.89 -5.53 4.02 0.26 1.76 -5.84 3.67 0.31
FINLAND 1.31 -2.79 2.82 2.14 -4.85 4.36 *** 1.59 -4.49 2.83 ** 2.42 -5.59 4.50 *** 1.51 -3.17 3.95 0.11 1.71 -4.81 3.31 0.74 1.38 -2.66 3.06 0.47
HOLLAND 1.16 -2.42 2.46 1.89 -5.00 3.38 *** 1.57 -2.78 2.92 0.10 1.82 -5.21 2.68 *** 1.14 -2.53 1.86 0.27 1.32 -3.15 2.50 0.29 1.24 -1.98 2.93 0.49
NORWAY 1.00 -2.29 2.18 1.99 -4.95 4.57 *** 1.66 -4.04 3.47 ** 2.11 -5.23 3.92 *** 1.49 -2.96 3.89 0.07 1.61 -4.73 3.88 0.08 1.31 -2.77 3.51 0.19
SPAIN 1.03 -2.13 2.29 1.61 -4.74 3.78 ** 1.43 -4.83 2.49 0.15 1.67 -6.03 3.06 *** 0.86 -1.78 1.96 0.68 1.16 -3.09 2.54 0.58 0.99 -2.30 2.39 0.20
SWEDEN 0.98 -2.16 2.00 1.69 -3.61 3.17 *** 1.41 -3.11 2.58 0.16 1.61 -4.07 2.09 *** 1.10 -2.77 2.06 0.12 1.22 -2.79 2.09 0.31 0.98 -2.36 2.02 0.34
TURKEY 2.49 -5.75 5.82 3.73 -9.25 8.78 *** 2.88 -8.04 7.09 0.26 4.29 -10.99 9.86 *** 3.56 -6.66 9.87 0.18 3.12 -8.23 7.98 0.65 3.13 -8.22 7.96 0.42
CANADA 0.71 -1.63 1.49 1.32 -3.32 2.29 *** 0.71 -1.81 1.51 0.98 1.19 -3.18 2.46 ** 0.88 -2.20 2.03 0.12 0.94 -1.90 2.13 ** 0.92 -1.92 2.21 0.08
FRANCE 0.90 -2.02 2.01 1.38 -3.34 2.94 *** 1.18 -2.95 2.20 0.19 1.51 -4.29 2.55 *** 0.84 -2.08 1.30 0.39 0.99 -3.08 2.20 0.69 0.90 -2.03 2.34 0.99
ITALY 1.26 -2.61 2.88 2.02 -4.33 4.96 ** 1.83 -4.19 3.38 0.11 2.08 -5.63 3.22 *** 1.46 -2.90 3.05 0.23 1.39 -3.91 2.86 0.33 1.16 -2.33 2.78 0.10
GERMANY 1.20 -2.54 2.27 2.01 -5.54 3.94 ** 1.52 -3.55 2.15 0.41 2.05 -5.68 3.51 *** 1.09 -2.31 2.10 0.31 1.58 -4.32 3.35 0.38 1.44 -2.58 3.62 0.82
JAPAN 0.93 -1.99 2.20 1.37 -3.00 3.76 0.24 1.36 -2.41 3.87 0.20 1.18 -2.55 3.03 0.61 1.05 -1.93 3.06 0.59 1.25 -3.22 3.56 0.25 0.69 -1.50 1.87 **
UK 0.86 -1.90 1.86 1.29 -3.13 3.00 *** 1.12 -2.13 2.59 0.09 1.52 -3.14 2.69 *** 1.15 -2.11 2.35 0.10 0.99 -2.03 2.89 0.11 0.89 -1.65 2.73 0.40
USA 0.87 -1.80 1.90 1.72 -3.32 3.70 *** 0.93 -1.77 1.68 0.19 1.31 -2.80 4.02 0.23 1.04 -1.83 3.49 0.79 1.01 -2.13 2.18 0.13 0.99 -2.11 2.16 0.16
ARGENTINA 1.60 -4.31 3.41 4.58 -10.44 8.51 *** 3.48 -8.82 6.55 *** 3.32 -10.44 7.41 ** 2.63 -4.85 8.49 0.13 2.23 -4.15 6.09 0.12 2.18 -4.74 6.53 0.33
BRAZIL 2.13 -4.84 4.31 7.67 -10.09 12.19 *** 6.68 -9.69 8.81 *** 3.89 -10.08 7.66 ** 3.24 -8.46 10.79 0.51 2.56 -5.19 6.72 0.20 2.57 -5.12 7.20 0.24
CHILE 1.03 -2.24 2.42 2.25 -5.04 4.34 *** 1.95 -3.87 4.08 *** 1.58 -5.04 2.53 0.16 1.27 -3.07 3.73 0.63 1.28 -2.86 3.36 0.09 1.31 -2.99 3.53 0.28
COLOMBIA 0.83 -2.01 2.17 1.10 -3.74 2.02 ** 1.14 -3.97 2.23 ** 0.91 -3.11 1.88 ** 0.85 -3.79 1.94 0.18 0.88 -2.08 2.47 0.40 0.91 -1.98 2.51 0.37
MEXICO 1.35 -2.78 3.23 3.21 -6.05 8.43 *** 2.19 -3.45 5.12 0.12 2.58 -5.57 6.40 ** 1.91 -3.75 5.89 0.50 1.80 -3.76 4.59 0.26 1.56 -3.66 3.62 0.61
PERU 1.01 -2.15 2.33 1.93 -5.64 3.84 *** 1.44 -5.34 3.37 ** 1.63 -5.11 3.78 ** 1.25 -2.83 3.84 0.47 1.21 -2.47 3.51 ** 1.16 -2.29 2.65 **
VENEZUELA 1.55 -3.98 3.48 2.63 -7.51 3.85 *** 2.33 -7.19 3.93 ** 2.03 -6.65 3.08 ** 1.50 -4.19 3.07 0.24 1.85 -4.55 3.67 0.32 1.95 -4.17 4.12 0.12
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.94 -2.30 2.10 1.61 -3.70 2.81 *** 1.44 -3.71 2.85 ** 1.83 -3.93 3.13 *** 1.43 -2.33 3.07 0.06 0.98 -2.21 2.06 0.96 0.99 -2.18 2.35 0.99
ESTONIA 1.84 -4.00 4.54 3.04 -10.49 7.01 *** 2.78 -8.05 8.57 0.22 3.54 -10.49 8.64 *** 3.42 -9.09 9.31 *** 2.37 -6.98 5.74 0.37 1.76 -6.16 4.63 0.76
HUNGARY 1.63 -3.48 3.48 3.65 -10.51 9.32 *** 2.46 -6.35 7.99 0.29 3.61 -10.76 5.91 *** 2.42 -7.22 4.22 0.14 2.18 -6.02 3.47 0.48 1.69 -3.49 3.12 0.72
POLAND 1.35 -3.02 3.03 2.61 -5.74 6.00 *** 1.84 -3.79 4.36 0.26 2.45 -6.27 4.66 *** 1.86 -4.38 3.86 ** 1.98 -5.00 3.75 0.06 1.51 -4.28 2.83 0.20
RUSSIA 2.49 -5.10 6.48 4.75 -12.49 13.85 ** 3.58 -6.54 8.44 0.13 9.74 -17.49 16.71 *** 9.37 -17.85 15.71 *** 3.46 -7.35 8.56 0.31 3.08 -7.29 8.32 0.18
SLOVAKIA 0.97 -2.49 2.38 0.97 -3.04 2.68 0.94 0.91 -3.07 2.93 0.94 1.19 -3.10 2.52 ** 1.11 -3.06 2.79 0.40 1.14 -3.07 2.90 0.47 1.31 -4.01 3.19 0.23
UKRAINE 2.07 -5.18 5.42 4.37 -10.94 8.99 *** 3.72 -10.94 8.99 0.08 3.27 -11.56 8.37 0.16 3.04 -7.04 8.83 0.19 2.37 -6.24 8.56 0.96 1.65 -3.68 8.28 0.99
Notes: Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.  Mean is the average  of one day percent returns in absolute values. The Kolmogorov Smirnov Test evaluates whether  the frequency distribution on days of turmoil in the corresponding emerging market 
            (with or without turmoil in a financial center) is different from the frequency distribution on all other days.   5th and 95th percentiles report the  the values of stock market returns at those percentiles.  The sample extends from January 1,1997 to August 31,1999.  ***,** 
            represent the significance of the Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test at the 1 and  5 percent respectively.
Table 6
COUNTRIES
percentilesmean
Financial Turmoil in Emerging Markets and Financial Centers: How Does It Spread?
mean percentiles K&S      p-value
K&S      
p-value mean
percentiles K&S      
p-value
percentiles K&S           p-
value mean
percentiles
Empirical Distribution of Stock Market Returns
percentiles K&S          
p-valuemean mean
percentiles K&S      
p-value mean
ON ALL DAYS ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN BRAZIL ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN RUSSIA ON DAYS OF TURMOIL IN THAILAND
With Financial Center Without Financial CenterWith Financial center Without Financial Center With Financial Center Without Financial Center
REGIONS
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
W          
p-value
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
W         
p-value
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
W         
p-value
Asia 14 0 29 14 67 0
Europe 100 29 100 0 0 0
G7 83 0 67 0 17 14
Latin America 100 83 86 0 14 14
Transition Economies 86 14 83 33 0 0
World 76 24 73 12 18 6
Wilcoxon Statistic (W) 1320 891 0.00 1452 759 0.00 1188 1023 0.00
Notes: The Financial Center is respectively USA for Brazil, Germany for Russia and Japan for Thailand.  Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.
An anomalous return is interpreted as a change in the distribution of returns in country j  on days of turmoil in country i .
Table 7
Regional and World Effects
Weak-Form Globalization of Turmoil
BRAZIL RUSSIA THAILAND
Percentage of Countries with Anomalous Returns when Turmoil in
TURMOIL IN GERMANY TURMOIL IN JAPAN  TURMOIL IN USA
Medium   2.51***   1.78***   1.25***
(7.88) (5.49) (3.74)
High      4.71***    2.56***    2.45***
(7.14) (5.72) (6.85)
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.08 0.10
Number of Observations 694 694 694
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent z statistics.  ***,**, * represents the significance of the coefficient at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels. Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. The left-hand-side 
variable captures the degree of globalization.  There are three possible degrees of globalization: 
Low ( when less than 25 percent of the countries in the sample experience turmoil), medium (when
more than 25 percent but less than 50 percent of the countries experience turmoil), high ( when 50 percent or more 
of all countries in the sample experience turmoil). In order to be able to estimate our model, coefficients for the low 
globalization case are set equal to zero (that is our base case).  Interpretation of the reported coefficients has to be 
done with respect to the base case.  Our model was estimated with a constant but constant coefficients are not
reported here for expositional purposes.
TURMOIL IN GERMANY TURMOIL IN JAPAN TURMOIL IN USA
Low 40 58 52
Medium 36 26 22
High 23 16 26
Notes: Turmoil is defined as observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles.
Probabilities are given in percent terms and are derived from the multinomial logit estimation shown
in the top panel.
Table 8
Strong-Form Globalization
Multinomial Logit Estimation
 Probabilities Conditional on
Coefficients
Degree Of Globalization
Degree of Globalization
))'exp(1/()'exp()(
2
1
∑
=
+==
i
ii xxiyP ββ
With Financial Center Without Financial Center p-values With Financial Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
p-values With Financial Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
p-values
Medium   2.14***    1.41*** 0.28    2.70***    1.36*** *    2.32***    0.91** **
(3.62) (3.61) (4.33) (3.61) (4.03) (2.3)
High    4.64***    2.47*** ***    5.53*** 1.18 ***    2.18*** 0.37 *
(8.44) (4.85) (7.87) (1.07) (2.6) (0.63)
Pseudo R2 0.13 Pseudo R2 0.15 Pseudo R2 0.03
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent z statistics.  ***,**, * represents the significance of the coefficient at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels. Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. The left-hand-side variable captures the 
degree of globalization. There are three possible degrees of globalization:  Low ( when less than 25 percent of the countries in the sample 
 experience turmoil), medium (when more than 25 percent but less than 50 percent of the countries experience turmoil), high ( when 50 
percent or more of all countries in the sample experience turmoil). In order to be able to estimate our model, coefficients for the low  
globalization case had to equal zero (that is our base case).  Interpretation of the reported coefficients has to be done with respect to the
 base case.   Our model was estimated with a constant but constant coefficients are not reported here for expositional purposes.
P column reports p values for test of equality between parameters estimated with and without Turmoil in Financial Centers. 
The financial Center is respectively USA for Brazil, Germany for Russia and Japan for Thailand.
Number of observations for our sample was 694.
With Financial Center Without Financial Center With Financial Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
With Financial Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
Low 21 56 87 23 75 92 47 80 90
Medium 21 27 10 27 23 7 40 17 8
High 57 17 2 50 2 1 13 4 3
Notes: Turmoil is defined as observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. Probabilities are given in percent terms and are derived 
from the multinomial logit estimation shown in the top panel.
TURMOIL
Degree of Globalization
Table 9
Strong-Form Globalization
Multinomial Logit Estimation
Coefficients
TURMOIL IN BRAZIL TURMOIL IN RUSSIA TURMOIL IN THAILAND
Degree of 
Globalization
Probabilities Conditional on
BRAZIL RUSSIA THAILAND
No TurmoilNo Turmoil
TURMOIL
No Turmoil
TURMOIL
))'exp(1/()'exp()(
2
1
∑
=
+==
i
ii xxiyP ββ
With Financial 
Center
Without Financial 
Center p-values
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
p-values With Financial Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
p-values
Medium 0.93*** -0.58*** *** 0.35 0.17 0.54 0.63** 0.05 *
(4.23) (-2.12) (1.31) (1.07) (2.34) (0.31)
High      2.67***     0.85** ***       2.71*** 0.37 ***        2.14*** 0.41 ***
(9.22) (2.11) (8.49) (0.99) (4.68) (1.15)
Pseudo R2                             : 0.07
Number of Observations     : 3469
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent z statistics.  ***,**, * represents the significance of the coefficient at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels. Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. The left-hand-side variable captures the 
degree of globalization. There are three possible degrees of globalization:  Low ( when less than 25 percent of the countries in the sample 
 experience turmoil), medium (when more than 25 percent but less than 50 percent of the countries experience turmoil), high ( when 50 
percent or more of all countries in the sample experience turmoil). In order to be able to estimate our model, coefficients for the low  
globalization  had to equal zero (that is our base case).  Interpretation of the reported coefficients has to be done with respect to the
 base case.   Our model was estimated with a constant but constant coefficients are not reported here for expositional purposes.
P column reports p values for test of equality between parameters estimated with and without Turmoil in Financial Centers. 
The financial Center is respectively USA for Brazil, Germany for Russia and Japan for Thailand.
With Financial 
Center 
Without 
financial 
Center
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
With 
Financial 
Center
Without financial 
Center
Low 77 51 84 61 70 60 76
Medium 21 36 13 24 28 31 22
High 1 13 3 15 2 9 2
Notes: Turmoil is defined as observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. Probabilities are given in Percent terms
and are derived from the multinomial logit estimation shown in the top panel.
Table 10
Strong-Form Globalization
Multinomial Logit Panel Estimation
Coefficients
Degree of 
Globalization
BRAZIL RUSSIA THAILAND
Turmoil in Russia Turmoil in ThailandDegree Of 
Globalization
Probabilities Conditional on
No Turmoil
Turmoil in Brazil
))'exp(1/()'exp()(
2
1
∑
=
+==
i
ii xxiyP ββ
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
p-value
Medium       0.65*** 0.01 ***
(4.76) (0.11)
High    2.64***     0.57*** ***
(14.64) (2.71)
Pseudo R2 0.07
#Observations 3469
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent z statistics.  ***,**, * represents the significance of the coefficient at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels. Turmoil is defined as those observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. The left-hand-side variable captures the 
degree of globalization. There are three possible degrees of globalization:  Low ( when less than 25 percent of the countries in the sample 
 experience turmoil), medium (when more than 25 percent but less than 50 percent of the countries experience turmoil), high ( when 50 
percent or more of all countries in the sample experience turmoil). In order to be able to estimate our model, coefficients for the low  
globalization  had to equal zero (that is our base case).  Interpretation of the reported coefficients has to be done with respect to the
 base case.   Our model was estimated with a constant but constant coefficients are not reported here for expositional purposes.
P column reports p values for test of equality between parameters estimated With and Without Turmoil in Financial Centers. 
The explanatory variable is emerging market.  Such variable could equal 0,1,2,3 depending on how many emerging markets 
(Brazil,Russia,Thailand) experienced turmoil concurrently.
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
With Financial 
Center
Without 
Financial 
Center
Low 77 56 76 19 75 2 73
Medium 21 31 22 20 22 4 21
High 1 13 2 62 4 94 6
Notes:
Turmoil is defined as observations in the 5th and 95th percentiles. Probabilities are given in percent terms and are derived from the multinomial
logit estimation shown in the top panel.
Table 11
Strong-Form Globalization
Multinomial Logit Panel Estimation
Degree of 
Globalization
Coefficients
Emerging Markets
Probabilities Conditional on
Degree of 
Globalization No Turmoil
TURMOIL IN ONE EMERGING 
MARKET
TURMOIL IN TWO EMERGING 
MARKETS
TURMOIL IN THREE 
EMERGING MARKETS
))'exp(1/()'exp()(
2
1
∑
=
+==
i
ii xxiyP ββ
Asymmetries
Proportion of 
Crashes
Proportion of 
Rallies
World 85 15
Asia 29 71
Latin America 69 31
Europe 61 39
G7 56 44
Transition Economies 61 39
Note: Numbers reported in the above table are in percent.
News on Days of High globalization
Center Periphery Center Periphery Center Periphery Center Periphery Center Periphery
Regional 8 8 18 23 11 10 11 3 2 7
World 10 10 30 15 10 10 10 5
Note : Numbers in the above table are in percent.
Degree of Globalization and Size of Returns
Small Medium Large
LOW 46 48 5
MEDIUM 12 86 2
HIGH 0 92 8
Notes: Numbers in the above table are in percent.
            Small returns are returns between the 3rd  (97th) and 5th (95th) percentiles.
            Medium Returns are returns between the 1st (99th) and 3rd (97th) percentiles.
            Large Returns are returns in the 1st (99th) percentile.
           The first cell of this table indicates that 46 percent of the days of low globalization had countries experiencing on average  
           a small return.
Degree of World Globalization
Regions
Regions
BANKING
Days of High Globalization
Returns
OTHER
Economy and Politics Monetary Policy
TABLE 12
Days of Globalization:  Asymmetries, Origins, and Size of Shocks
International Agreements
Proportion of Days with News about the
Financial Sector
Appendix Table  
The Globalization of Financial Turmoil: Chronology of News 
January 1, 1997 to August 31, 1999 
 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
7-Apr-97   57    
EUR:  European and US Stocks up, benefiting from 
comments of EU finance ministers who indicated the 
single currency will begin on time. (FS-OTHER, 
CENTER) 
28-Aug-97  71     
ASIA: Investors flee the region amid a deepening loss 
of confidence in the ability of governments to tackle 
their severe economic problems. (E&PN, 
PERIPHERY) 
22-Oct-97  57     
ASIA: Share prices fall sharply in Asian markets due 
to a sharp drop in futures prices in Singapore and 
fears about higher interest rates and currency stability 
in Hong Kong. (FS-OTHER,PERIPHERY) 
23-Oct-97   57 71 57  
G7, EUR, LA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority was 
forced to sell US dollars to support the currency, 
triggering interest rate hikes that prompted a global 
sell off. (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
27-Oct-97 57  71 86 86  
EUR, G7, LA: A $600 billion sell-off shut down the US 
market for the first time since 1981.  The sell-off was 
triggered by Southeast Asia’s shaky economies, by a 
jump in interest rates, as well as by a stream of weak 
earning reports.  Panic grips other regions as US 
market crashes especially after the Hong Kong 
declines of the past week. (E&PN, PERIPHERY); 
(FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
28-Oct-97 80 100 86 86 71 57 
ASIA, EUR, TRA, G7: still reacting to US-market-
crash and Hong Kong crash.  (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
 
LA:  Markets soar as US market rallies.   (FS-
OTHER, CENTER)        
29-Oct-97 63 57 71 86  71 
EUR, G7, TRA: Markets soared as US soared the 
day before. (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
 
ASIA: Asian markets finish lower as investors fear 
another steep drop in US markets. (FS-OTHER, 
CENTER) 
30-Oct-97   71  57  
EUR: Stocks soared after Greenspan eased concern 
that inflation could be on the rise. (MP, CENTER) 
 
LA: Strong declines in the region stemmed from 
contagion in Asia.  Fears about Brazil ‘s real currency 
and liquidity crunch of its banking system. (FS-
OTHER, PERIPHERY); (FS-BANKING, 
PERIPHERY) 
3-Nov-97  57     
ASIA: Stocks rally as a financial aid package to 
Indonesia restores calm to the region. China also 
eases credit. (IA, PERIPHERY); (MP, PERIPHERY)  
7-Nov-97    57   G7: The US dollar surges reaching a six-month high as concerns increased in the market over the ability 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
of the Japanese government to revive the country’s 
economy. (E&PN, CENTER) 
12-Nov-97     71 71 
LA: Concern about fiscal austerity package 
announced by Brazil. Markets also fall after steep 
declines in Asian markets. (E&PN, PERIPHERY), 
(FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
 
TRA: Stocks fall after major drops in Asian markets.    
(FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY)  
17-Nov-97   86 57   
EUR, G7: Stocks up as Japan PM hints that public 
spending may be used to stimulate the economy and 
protect depositors following the collapse of the 
nation’s largest bank.  US reports low inflation 
measures. (FS-BANKING CENTER); (E&PN, 
CENTER) 
24-Nov-97   57    
EUR: Shares fall after the collapse of Japan’s fourth 
largest brokerage firm, Yamaichi Securities company. 
(FS-BANKING, CENTER) 
1-Dec-97    57   G7: Stock markets rally on gains in Asian markets overnight  (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
11-Dec-97  100 57    
ASIA: Stocks slumped as Moody’s cut rating of South 
Korea’s currency. (E&PN, PERIPHERY) 
 
EUR: Stocks down amid a new wave of selling in 
Asian markets and signs of weakness in the US 
economy  (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY); (E&PN, 
CENTER) 
9-Jan-98     71  
LA:  Asian turmoil, especially concerns about 
Indonesia, causes markets declines. Central Bank of 
Chile raises key interest rate (FS-OTHER,
PERIPHERY); (MP, PERIPHERY) 
12-Jan-98   71   71 
EUR, TRA: Peregrine, one of Asia’s largest 
investment banks (Hong Kong), files for liquidation 
raising concerns about emerging markets in general 
(FS-BANKING, PERIPHERY) 
13-Jan-98  71     ASIA: Stocks rose on optimism about IMF backed reforms for the region (IA, PERIPHERY) 
14-Jan-98  86     ASIA:  Stocks continued to rise on optimism about IMF backed reforms for the region (IA, PERIPHERY)
19-Jan-98  100     
ASIA: Indonesia signaled commitment to the much 
awaited bank reform.  Camdessus issues statement 
of confidence about Malaysia and countries in the 
region.(FS-BANKING, PERIPHERY); (IA, 
PERIPHERY)   
22-Jan-98  57     
ASIA: The plunging Indonesian rupiah dragged the 
rest of Asia into a downward spiral.  (FS-OTHER, 
PERIPHERY) 
2-Feb-98  71     
ASIA: Stocks up as value oriented funds flooded back 
into Asia from Europe and US. Strength driven by 
liquidity even though nothing changed in the 
fundamentals front. (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
27-Apr-98   86 86   EUR, G7: Concern US will raise interest rates to fight Inflation (MP, CENTER)  
26-May-98     57  LA: Concerns about a potential devaluation in Russia 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
affecting Brazil and other emerging markets. (FS-
OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
27-May-98   57    
EUR: Speculation about Russian devaluation of the 
ruble caused fall in stock prices.  (FS-OTHER, 
PERIPHERY) 
1-Jun-98      57 
TRA: Russian stock prices plummeted while the main 
market for Russian futures announced that it was 
suspending trading indefinitely.  Unfulfilled 
expectations of foreign aid to Russia contributed to 
the declines. (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY); (IA, 
PERIPHERY) 
15-Jun-98 51 86 57  57  
ASIA: Japanese government announced that GDP 
contracted for a second consecutive quarter.  (E&PN, 
CENTER)  
 
ASIA, LA, G7, TRA: Loss of confidence in emerging 
markets in general as Russian market tumbled for a 
seventh straight day. (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
17-Jun-98  71     
ASIA: US and Japan coordinated actions to sell US 
dollars and buy Japanese yens.  Markets soared due 
to the stronger yen. (IA, CENTER) 
18-Jun-98  100     
ASIA: Countries in the region still reacting to the US 
and Japan coordinated actions to prop up the yen (IA, 
CENTER) 
14-Jul-98      71 TRA: Russia would receive 22.6 billion dollars from   IMF and other bilateral donors (IA, PERIPHERY) 
11-Aug-98 60   86 71 57  
EUR, G7, LA: Foreign investors seemed to be the 
main driving force behind the market drop.  Fears of a 
weaker yen, and the prospect of devaluation in China 
sent shock waves throughout the world. (FS-OTHER, 
CENTER); (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
13-Aug-98      71 
TRA: Russian shares fell more than 10 percent early 
on growing fears of a liquidity crisis among  
Russian banks. (FS-BANKING, PERIPHERY) 
18-Aug-98   57    EUR: Gains in European markets following a major Wall Street advance (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
20-Aug-98     71  
LA: Concern Russian banks may fail and Venezuela 
may devalue (FS-BANKING, PERIPHERY); (FS-
OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
21-Aug-98 54  71 71 71  
LA: Concern about imminent currency devaluation in 
Venezuela.  (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
 
EUR, G7, LA: Russia’s Central Bank stated that 
some Russian banks could go bankrupt accentuating 
the Russian financial crisis.  In Germany (a major 
lender to Russia) stocks plunged, triggering downfalls 
in London and Paris (FS-BANKING, PERIPHERY); 
(FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
26-Aug-98   71    EUR: Stocks fall as Russia announces its debt restructuring plan (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
27-Aug-98 74  86 100 100 86 
EUR, G7, LA, TRA: Russia’s government unable to 
sell its newly restructured GKO bills spreading fear 
that global crisis will continue.   (FS-OTHER, 
PERIPHERY) 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
1-Sep-98   57  57  
LA:  Stocks end sharply higher mirroring the DJIA’s 
rebound (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
 
EUR: Stocks up on optimism about Europe’s 
prospects.   (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
2-Sep-98   71   57 
TRA: Markets rebound as investors went for 
bargains.   (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
 
EUR: Stocks follow rebound in the US stock market. 
(FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
3-Sep-98   57 57 57  
LA:  Moody’s downgraded Brazil’s and Venezuela’s 
foreign debt and put Argentina’s foreign currency 
debt and 11 banks on review for a possible 
downgrade. (E&PN, PERIPHERY),  (FS-BANKING, 
PERIPHERY) 
 
EUR, G7: European stock markets were hurt by a 
dollar plunge and worries that financial troubles are 
spreading from Russia and Asia to Latin America. 
(FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
4-Sep-98      57 
TRA: Russia’s parliament delays a vote on 
Chernomyrdin’s appointment as Prime Minister at 
Yeltsin’s request.  (E&PN, PERIPHERY) 
7-Sep-98  57 57    
ASIA: Stronger yen and a higher stock market helps 
Japanese banks but fund managers stay skeptical 
(FS-BANKING, CENTER). 
 
EUR: Greenspan hints he would favor cutting interest 
rates. (MP, CENTER) 
8-Sep-98    57  57 
G7, TRA: Renewed confidence was felt thanks to 
market supportive comments from Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan.(MP, CENTER) 
10-Sep-98 60  71 71 86 57 
EUR, G, TRA, LA: Worries about banks exposures as 
S&P downgrades Spain’s second largest bank. 
Credit ratings for Argentina’s two largest banks were 
also reduced. (FS-BANKING, CENTER);      (FS-
BANKING, PERIPHERY) 
11-Sep-98      57 
LA: Brazilian Government boosted overnight interest 
rates by 20 percentage points to try to stem capital 
flight, which reached 2.2 billion dollars the day before.
(FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
14-Sep-98    71  71 G7, TRA: Russia’s new PM pledges to revive the economy. (E&PN, PERIPHERY) 
15-Sep-98     86 57 
LA, TRA: G7 meeting hints at financial aid for Latin 
America.  Argentina may borrow 5.7 billion dollars 
from the World Bank and other international 
institutions.  (IA, PERIPHERY) 
17-Sep-98 54  86 86   EUR, G7: Greenspan states that there is no move to coordinate interest rates (MP, CENTER) 
21-Sep-98   86 57   
G7, EUR: Concern about Japan’s recession and low 
growth potential for OECD countries due to emerging 
markets collapse and deepening financial collapse. 
Political parties in Japan remains at odds on how to 
use taxpayer money to prop up LTCB of Japan. 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
(E&PN, CENTER); (FS-OTHER, EMERGING); (FS-
BANKING, CENTER) 
22-Sep-98   71    EUR: US markets rebound day after the Clinton grand jury testimony.  (E&PN, CENTER) 
23-Sep-98   57.14 57 100  
LA:  President of IDB says Brazil could receive up to 
50 billion dollars in aid from international institutions. 
IMF and US also gave statements of support for 
Brazil Aid.  (IA, PERIPHERY) 
 
G7, EUR: Investors hope that Greenspan will hint at a 
possible rate cut when he testifies before the senate 
banking committee. (MP, CENTER)  
24-Sep-98  86   57  
ASIA: Stocks up as Greenspan suggests he may 
lower interest rates. (MP, CENTER) 
 
LA: Stocks down as concern over banks is felt after 
some of the largest banks put together a 4-billion 
dollar bailout of LTCM raising concern about credit. 
Brazil announces fiscal austerity measures. (E&PN, 
PERIPHERY); (FS-BANKING,CENTER) 
25-Sep-98      71 
TRA: Russian tax collection continued to plummet in 
September, due to the crash on Russian financial 
markets and the country's ensuing banking crisis 
(statement by tax official).  (E&PN, PERIPHERY) 
30-Sep-98    57   G7:  US cut interest rates and asked other countries to follow suit. (MP, CENTER) 
1-Oct-98 66  86 100 71  
G7, EUR, LA:  Concerns about global economic 
slump. Report US manufacturing production 
weakened for fourth straight month as exports 
slumped. (E&PN, CENTER) 
2-Oct-98     57 57 
LA: Stock markets soared on hopes of a financial 
package for troubled Brazil (IA, PERIPHERY) 
 
TRA: Stocks still falling following global declines of 
October first. (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
6-Oct-98    57   
G7: Disappointment that the G7 meeting in 
Washington failed to adopt a clear strategy to 
address global economic issues drove share prices 
sharply lower in world markets. (IA, CENTER) 
8-Oct-98 51  86 71   
EUR, G7: Speculation the Fed would cut interest 
rates.  Japan moves to repair its economy. (MP, 
CENTER) (E&PN, CENTER) 
9-Oct-98  57  57 57  
ASIA, G7: Interest cuts in UK and other European 
countries in the preceding week generated rallies in 
several markets.  (MP, CENTER) 
 
LA:  Brazilian authorities and the International 
Monetary Fund issued a joint statement on the 
availability of a rescue package to help cushion the 
region from market turmoil (IA, PERIPHERY) 
12-Oct-98 54 57 71 71   
EUR, G7, ASIA: Japan will substantially increase the 
amount of money it will spend on shoring up its fragile 
banking system.  (FS-BANKING, CENTER) 
16-Oct-98  71 71    EUR, G7: Fed Funds rate cut by a quarter 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
percentage point on Oct. 15th.  (MP,CENTER) 
20-Oct-98   57 57   
EUR, G7: Suggestions that France and Germany 
would lower their interest rates boosted investor 
sentiment in Europe as well as continued gains in the 
USA and a rally in Asian markets (MP, CENTER); 
(FS-OTHER, CENTER); (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
27-Oct-98   71    EUR: Italy makes a surprise cut in interest rate by a full percentage point.  (MP, CENTER) 
30-Oct-98      71  
LA: G7 countries said they would back a new IMF 
credit line to Brazil, speeding aid to Brazil. 
(IA,PERIPHERY) 
2-Nov-98   71       57 
EUR, TRA: Stocks rallied after the October 30th US 
commerce department report announcing better than 
expected third quarter growth rates. (E&PN,
CENTER) 
4-Nov-98    71   
G7: Democrats increased seats in the US 
Congressional elections, the first party with an 
incumbent resident to do this since 1934. Stocks rally 
after interest rate cuts in Italy and Sweden in the past 
week (E&PN, CENTER); (MP, CENTER) 
10-Nov-98  57     ASIA: Investors await the release of the Japanese government’s stimulus package (E&PN, CENTER). 
11-Nov-98  57     ASIA: Japan’s newest economic stimulus package is expected to be the largest ever. (E&PN, CENTER) 
20-Nov-98    57   
EUR:  European stocks finished with strong gains as 
bourses benefited from hopes of further European 
rate cuts. (MP, CENTER) 
30-Nov-98    57 57  
G7: Global markets were given a boost after the DJIA 
marked a record high.  (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
 
LA: Latin American investors were influenced by 
heavy profit taking on Wall Street and Brazil.  (FS-
OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
1-Dec-98   57 71   G7, EUR: Stocks down on weak dollar (FS, CENTER, OTHER) 
3-Dec-98     57  
LA: The US dollar weakened as investors were 
discouraged by the continuing decline in U.S. stocks 
and Wednesday's defeat in the Brazilian Congress of 
an important government austerity measure. (FS-
OTHER, CENTER); (E&PN, PERIPHERY) 
21-Dec-98    57   G7:  High expectations on the Euro boost stocks. (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
4-Jan-99   86 57   
EUR, G7: Stock prices ended up higher lured by a 
weak dollar and start of Euro trading.  (FS-OTHER, 
CENTER) 
6-Jan-99  57  71   
G7: US rallied on the back of technology stocks. (FS-
OTHER, CENTER) 
 
ASIA:  Japanese market followed an overnight jump 
in New York stocks lead by strength in the high-
technology sector. (FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
12-Jan-99     57  
LA:  Markets closed sharply lower due to rumors of 
an interest rate hike in Brazil and a near $200 million 
outflow. (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
DAY ALL ASIA EUR G7 LA TRA NEWS 
13-Jan-99 66  100 57 86 57 
EUR, LA, TRA: Brazil’s Central Bank Chairman 
resigns.  Brazil devalues its currency. (E&PN, 
PERIPHERY); (MP, PERIPHERY) 
14-Jan-99     57  
LA: Standard & Poor’s downgraded certain Latin 
American Banks and some of Brazil’s foreign 
currency debt. (FS-BANKING, PERIPHERY) 
15-Jan-99     71  LA: Brazil lets its currency float against the dollar (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
18-Jan-99   57    
EUR: Bank mergers in France, Spain and calmer 
financial markets in Brazil pushed stocks higher (FS-
BANKING, CENTER); (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY). 
9-Feb-99    57   
G7: There were growing concerns in Europe about a 
slowdown in the economy. European markets fell 
following financial turmoil in emerging markets. 
Japanese investors were waiting for measures, if any, 
from the BOJ to curb the recent sharp rise in bond 
yields, which would increase borrowing costs for 
companies and could stall Japan's efforts to revive its 
battered economy. (E&PN,CENTER); (FS-OTHER, 
PERIPHERY) 
5-Mar-99    86   
G7:  Labor department reported hourly wages rose 
0.1 percent in February, less than the 0,3 percent 
forecasted. Unemployment went up 0.1 percent point. 
(E&PN, CENTER) 
16-Apr-99  57     
ASIA:  Influx of European funds brought up Asian 
stocks posting sharp gains throughout the region. 
(FS-OTHER, CENTER) 
19-Apr-99  57     ASIA: Investors fell confident that the global financial crisis is largely over. (FS-OTHER, PERIPHERY) 
26-May-99     71  
LA: Markets rebound as fears concerning Argentina’s 
ability to maintain its currency board (as well as fears 
about a potential political scandal involving Brazilian 
President Cardoso) subside. (FS-OTHER, 
PERIPHERY) ; (E&PN, PERIPHERY) 
29-July-99    57   
G7: Investors were relieved when Alan Greenspan 
offered nothing new to upset global markets in a 
testimony to US lawmakers. (MP, CENTER) 
 
Notes: 
FS:       News from the financial Sector. They could either originate in the banking sector (BANKING) or not (OTHER). 
MP:      News about Monetary Policy 
E&PN: News about the economy (excluding the financial sector) and political news. 
IA:        Refers to international agreements or policy coordination actions 
ASIA:   Includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. 
EUR:    Includes Finland, Greece, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. 
G7:       Includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
LA:       Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
TRA:    Includes Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
 
Numbers in cells represent the percentage of countries in their respective region (or world) experiencing turmoil on that 
day. 
The parenthetical statements after each news event explain the region from which news originated and our classification of 
news. For example, On July 29,1999; 57 percent of the G7 countries were affected by Alan Greenspan’s testimony. His 
testimony was classified as Monetary Policy News originating in the Center (MP, CENTER). 
